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Abstract: Empirical examinations about cross-cultural variability of in-
tuitions, the well-known publication of Stich and his colleagues criticiz-
ing thought-experiments and intuitions in philosophical debates, is still 
a challenge that faces analytical philosophers, as any systematic inves-
tigation of the methodology of philosophy must give answers to these 
basic questions: What is intuition? What role should intuitions play in 
philosophy? I present and examine the sceptical argument of experi-
mental philosophers, and claim that experimental philosophers misun-
derstand the role of evidence in philosophy. My argument will utilize 
Goldman’s view, according to which intuitions give reliable (though 
not infallible) evidence about a person’s concepts, and this knowledge 
is valuable for further philosophical research as well. I will argue that 
the sceptical conclusions of experimental philosophers are harmless 
against this conception of philosophy, because even from a naturalist 
perspective certain kind of intuitive judgments about our concepts can 
be warranted, and this grants the specific epistemic status of intuitions. 
Of course, the reliability of introspection can be challenged. However, 
denying self-knowledge about my internal mental states is disputable – 
as I will show – both from a philosophical and a scientific point of vieW.
Keywords: concepts, experimental philosophy, intuition, methodology 
of philosophy, reliabilism, scepticism, thought-experiments.
1 Introduction
There are several well known philosophical arguments which ap-
peal to so called “intuitions” and build on thought-experiments. Intu-
itions are usually considered as evidences in favour of various philo-
sophical doctrines. We encounter intuitions in the most influential 
papers of analytical philosophy. For example, Kripke claimed that his 
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argument for the rigidity of proper names is built on linguistic intu-
itions1, and argued that our intuitions are the ultimate evidences in fa-
vour of philosophical theories about meaning.2 
Intuitions are claimed to be essential for the entire enterprise of 
analytical philosophy, nevertheless their role and evidential status are 
far from obvious. Since Steven Stich and his colleagues had published 
their empirical examinations3 and criticized appealing to thought-ex-
periments and intuitions in philosophical discussions, the debate about 
the role of intuitions in analytical philosophy has become one of the 
most exciting issues about the methodology of and the role of evidence 
for philosophy. 
In the past years experimental philosophers4 (Steven Stich, Jona-
than Weinberg, Shaun Nichols, Joshua Knobe, and others) challenged 
the view that the project of analytical philosophy is a meaningful and 
sensible way of doing philosophy. Many prominent analytical philoso-
phers have faced these challenges, and attempted to give viable an-
swers to the sceptical considerations, as well as presented alternatives 
to the proper methodology of philosophy. 
This is a subtle and complex debate, and I’ll focus mostly on the 
sceptical challenge of reliability of intuitions. I would like present the 
sceptical arguments of the experimental philosophers, and outline 
some possible responses to them. We have good reasons to think that 
experimental philosophers misunderstand the role of evidence in phi-
losophy; therefore their sceptical conclusions are unsupported. I will 
1 Kripke (1972; 2001, 11-12). 
2 “If someone thinks that the notion of a necessary or contingent property 
(forget whether there are any nontrivial necessary properties [and con-
sider] just the meaningfulness of the notion) is a philosopher’s notion with 
no intuitive content, he is wrong. Of course, some philosophers think that 
something’s having intuitive content is very inconclusive evidence in favor 
of it. I think it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything, myself. I really 
don’t know, in a way, what more conclusive evidence one can have about 
anything, ultimately speaking” (Kripke 1972; 2001, 41-42).
3 Weinberg – Nichols – Stich (2008).
4 Experimental philosophy is an emerging field of inquiry that makes use 
of empirical data of the intuitions of ordinary people in order to inform 
research on philosophical questions. This use of empirical data is widely 
considered as opposed to a philosophical methodology that relies mainly 
on a priori justification. Webpage: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jk762/Ex-
perimentalPhilosophy.html (2011.03.24.) 
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build on Goldman’s account for a different status of intuitions and 
argue that the sceptical conclusions of experimental philosophers are 
harmless against this conception of philosophy.
2 Conceptual analysis and intuitions
One of the main methods of analytical philosophy is conceptual 
analysis.5 Philosophers attempt to give a proper and consistent defi-
nition of a concept (knowledge, freedom, rationality, morality, beau-
ty, etc.). Before I present the sceptical arguments against intuitions, I 
would like to summarize briefly the general structure of arguments 
used in conceptual analysis.
The arguments have a general form like this: We have a naive con-
cept, for instance about knowledge. We would like to understand what 
knowledge is. In order to have an exact and adequate definition, we 
imagine a hypothetical situation S, and then ask whether we can ap-
ply concept C to the situation S. And our intuition gives the answer: If 
intuition shows that concept C cannot be applied to situation S, then 
we ought to redefine our concept. Philosophical theories which match 
with our intuitions are generally considered better (i.e. more plausi-
ble). According to this conception about methodology of philosophy, 
intuitions are certain kind of judgments, or the inclination of belief, by 
which we can test philosophical theories and argue for and against an 
interpretation of a concept.
Gettier’s argument against the traditional conception of knowledge 
is an influential example from epistemology. Gettier’s article intro-
duced a certain type of philosophical thinking, namely we examine our 
concepts by means of imagining possible situations and somehow our 
intuition justify or falsify our philosophical interpretations of a con-
cept. Several further thought-experiments are formulated in episte-
mology.6 They have the same logical structure: we assume a definition 
about knowledge, and we have counterexamples which show us that 
we ought to correct our definition. According to supporters of this kind 
of conceptual analysis, appealing to our intuitions is a reliable method 
in order to test various naive and philosophical theories. 
5 For examples of standard analysis of epistemological concepts see Sosa 
(1994).
6 For instance, Lehrer’s Truetemp case, or Dretske’s zebra example: Lehrer 
(2000), Dretske (1970).
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In moral and political philosophy we usually use a very similar 
method, namely reflective equilibrium. This strategy in which a norma-
tive rule is dismissed if it yields an inference we are intuitively unwill-
ing to accept and an inference is rejected if it violates a normative rule 
we are intuitively unwilling to dismiss.7 
Intuitions are usually characterized as spontaneous judgments 
about specific cases. But the main question is that, how could intuitions 
support philosophical claims? Why should we trust our intuitions? 
How can we know that our intuitions (whatever they could be) provide 
evidences for philosophical claims? As we will see, the answers to these 
questions are crucial in order to judge the weight of the pro and contra 
arguments about reliability of intuitions in philosophy.
3 The sceptical argument against reliability of intuition
The sceptical argument against appealing to intuitions has the same 
form of one of the ancient sceptical tropes, namely the argument from 
criterion (or disagreement).8 But this modern version of the argument is 
built on a systematic investigation of the empirical data. Stephen Stich 
and his colleagues have done an empirical research about ordinary 
people’s intuitions. They used a method familiar to the social-psychol-
ogists: they asked groups of East-Asian and American students about 
famous philosophical thought-experiments (for instance, the Gettier 
case). The subjects read the description of a contrafactual situation, and 
they had to decide between two options (for instance, in the Gettier 
case, whether Smith has knowledge, or he has just justified belief). 
These investigations showed that intuitions are not universally the 
same, they vary from culture to culture, from one socioeconomic group 
to another.9 Other philosophical doctrines were examined, for instance 
7 Here I follow Goodman’s formulation. Goodman (1965, 66).
8 For an interpretation of the ancient sceptical argument see Barnes (1990, 
1-36).
9 Here are some examples. 60 % of Asian students answered that in Gettier 
case the subject has knowledge. 70 % of American students answered the 
subject has just a (justified) belief. Several other philosophical arguments 
were examined, for instance, Keith Lehrer’s Truetemp case. In this case only 
65 % of Western (American) students said that Mr. Truetemp only has a 
true belief, but he lacks knowledge. On the other hand, 85 % of Asian stu-
dents answered that Mr. Truetemp has justified belief, and 15 % said that he 
has real knowledge. See Weinberg – Nichols – Stich (2008, 25-34).
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about linguistic, moral intuitions, intuitions about determinism and 
moral responsibility, and other issues.10
The sceptical argument against the reliability of philosophical in-
tuitions can be reconstructed like this. There are contradictions among 
the intuitions of individuals. Two intuitions which contradict each 
other cannot be equally true. We don’t have an independent criterion 
in order to determine whose intuitions are ‘true’, or ‘reliable’. If we 
don’t have criterion, we cannot know which intuition can be used as 
evidence for philosophical claims. Therefore, philosophical arguments 
which are built on intuitions are unsupported. 
The argument can be formulated as a dilemma: There are contradic-
tions between people’s intuitions about the same topic. We have two 
options. First, we accept all intuitions as equally good, valid, or reliable. 
Therefore, we ought to accept inconsistent claims and norms which are 
based on inconsistent intuitions. This would be irrational, of course. 
The second option is that intuitions are not universally valid. There-
fore, philosophical arguments are persuasive only among the philoso-
phers who adopt the same (or at least very similar) intuitions. 
Experimental philosophers don’t hesitate to draw this conclusion, 
and based on this they argued for an entirely different conception of 
philosophy. According to the strongest form of this kind of natural-
ist approach, analytical philosophy as an evaluative and normative 
project is not a sensible or productive way of philosophical thinking 
at all, therefore we need to replace the traditional methodology of con-
ceptual analysis with an empirically based, so called “ethnographic” 
research of the variability of people’s intuitions. Instead of appealing 
to our philosophical intuitions which seem evident and unproblematic 
only for a narrow circle of population, philosophy should be a purely 
empirical and descriptive investigation of the folk’s “intuitions” (i.e. 
beliefs, judgments).11
4 Responses to the sceptical argument
The first problem is that the sceptical argument seems to be ques-
tion-begging. If we accept the view that the philosopher’s normative 
claims are not reliable, for the reason that they are not universal, but 
10 Machery – Mallon – Nichols – Stich (2004); Nichols – Knobe (2007).
11 Knobe – Nichols (2008).
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just local and relative to her own cultural and socioeconomic group, we 
already exclude the possibility that the philosopher might have some 
kind of expert’s knowledge which naturally differs from the layman’s 
beliefs.
Here the experimental philosopher’s objection might be the follow-
ing: the problem is that philosopher’s “intuitive” claims are not justi-
fied because the intuitions are not “calibrated”. An instrument is reli-
able, even if we make mistakes, but we have independent factors and 
methods by means of which we are able to recognize the mistakes and 
correct them.12 However, in philosophy we appeal only to intuitions, 
the only available evidence are the intuitions which arise in hypotheti-
cal cases, therefore there cannot be any independent justification of the 
reliability of philosopher’s intuitions. 
But this objection is harmful only if we presuppose that the ultimate 
and fundamental pieces of evidence in favour of philosophical (norma-
tive) claims are only intuitions, that’s all we have.13 Actually, experi-
mental philosophers assume that according to analytical philosophers 
intuitions are the fundamental, ultimate evidences in philosophy.14 
This assumption is not entirely unsupported. Indeed we can find sev-
eral passages in the writings of analytical philosophers, in which they 
dignify intuitions (let them be whatever) with this specific epistemic 
status,15 nevertheless this presumption seems to me very unreasonable. 
It is important to recognize that experimental philosophers have a cer-
tain conception about philosophical thinking. But this picture is a sim-
plified one, and this simplification is so grave that in the end giving up 
the sceptical considerations appears justified.
In philosophical debates we can and should appeal to our back-
ground knowledge about the world, our experience, our memory, our 
inference-mechanism used in everyday reasoning and science (includ-
ing inductive reasoning and analogical reasoning), just as much as we 
12 Weinberg (2007).
13 Experimental philosophers accept this presumption about analytical phi-
losophy. See Weinberg (2007).
14 For example, Knobe – Nichols (2008, 8).
15 For a strong rationalist view see Bealer (1996) and (2002). One of the clas-
sical examples of conceptual analysis of our epistemic terms is Chisholm’s 
book, Chisholm (1989).    
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use transcendental arguments, reductio ad absurdum arguments,16 and 
build on testimonial knowledge.17 
I think evidence in philosophy can be in a sense empirical as well. 
Consider again the conceptual analysis of knowledge. We don’t think 
that guessing or wishful thinking is knowledge. But why? If we would 
adopt a pure rationalist view, we will have an answer like this: because 
guessing or wishful thinking are necessarily not instances of knowledge, 
and by means of our “rational seemings” somehow we intuitively know 
that. We image hypothetical situations of guessing, and we wouldn’t 
say that in these cases the subject has knowledge, and so on. But doesn’t 
this account seem incomplete and simplified, as the question still re-
mains: why we have an “intuition” that by guessing we cannot acquire 
knowledge? Nothing excludes a priori that guessing or wishful think-
ing can lead us to reliable knowledge about the world. If in our world 
there were some people who are (for some reason) extremely talented 
in guessing of the exact number of the people in a mass, then in this 
case guessing (or at least the guesses of these people) could lead us to 
justified true beliefs, or even knowledge. And if a benevolent fairy, who 
would accomplish all our desires, existed in this world, wishful think-
ing wouldn’t necessarily lead to false, illusory beliefs.18
We exclude that guessing or wishful thinking are forms of knowl-
edge which are not built on a priori ideas, but rather on experiences and 
inferences which support this everyday belief. We live in a world in 
which we have observed that by guessing we cannot frequently acquire 
true beliefs. I have these “intuitions”, partly because I have grown up in 
a certain society, and I learned this conception about knowledge from 
others.
However from this we shouldn’t necessarily conclude to a cultural 
relativism. If we don’t accept a global sceptical view about reliability of 
16 Ryle gives a systematic account of the reductio ad absurdum arguments in 
philosophy. See Ryle (2009).
17 Already in “meta-level” of philosophical inquiry we appeal to testimonial 
knowledge: we believe that the author of a cited philosophical article really 
exists or existed, etc. And of course in several philosophical thought-exper-
iments we appeal to scientific knowledge. (For instance, Putnam’s Twin-
Earth thought-experiment presumes that we know that water is H2O; in 
philosophy of mind we have a textbook example of the identity of mental 
and physical: pain is firing of the C-fibers, etc.)
18 I follow Goldman’s considerations here. See Goldman (1979, 16-17).
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our cognitive skills, we have reasons to think that there can be a very 
simple empirical justification or corroboration of these folk beliefs (“in-
tuitions”), therefore at least some of our intuitions can provide reasons 
to distinguish adequate and inadequate philosophical theories.
5 Knowing our own concepts
In the previous part, I gave a short summary about the method 
of conceptual analysis, the sceptical argument against intuitions, and 
outlined some possible responses. Now, I would like to present an al-
ternative view about the role of intuitions. Based on Alvin Goldman’s 
theory I will argue for a different kind of philosophical methodology.19 
Goldman states that the philosophical analysis targets concepts, not in 
a Fregean (or Platonist) sense, but rather in an individualized and psy-
chological sense. A concept is a mental representation of a subject. Intu-
itions give reliable, though not infallible evidence about a person’s own 
concepts, and relations to her other concepts and beliefs. This knowl-
edge is a real knowledge valuable for further philosophical research 
as well. Philosophy is not just about meditating on my own concepts, 
though this is an important starting point for further investigations.
A definition of intuitions would be the following: intuitions are 
cognitive processes which produce introspective beliefs about my own 
concepts (what I think about knowledge, freedom, etc.), and by intu-
ition I can determine whether a concept C can be applied to a situation 
S. Goldman builds on discoveries of cognitive science and argues that 
there is a causal process between my concept and the intuitive (intro-
spective) understanding of the concept. Therefore, intuition is reliable 
(in terms of his reliabilist account), though unlike Cartesian introspec-
tion, these intuitions are not infallible.20
The sceptical conclusion of experimental philosophers based on 
variability of intuitions is irrelevant because the variability of subject’s 
intuitions is taken for granted. A has an intuition that concept C can be 
applied to situation S, B has an intuition that concept C’ can be applied 
19 Goldman (2007).
20 Goldman (2007, 9-16).
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to situation S, but of course they have different, individual and subjec-
tive concepts.21 
Even from the strongest naturalist point of view a certain kind of 
intuitive judgments about our concepts can be warranted. It is impor-
tant to note that empirical investigations of people’s intuitions appeal 
to this kind of “introspective” knowledge as well. When experimental 
philosophers asked the subjects about various, hypothetical cases, the 
assumption that the individual is able to access her “intuitions” and 
give an adequate description of them must be taken for granted, oth-
erwise the whole project of empirical investigation of intuitions runs 
aground.
Now we can outline a possible answer to the question: what are the 
thought-experiments (and intuitions) good for? My answer is the fol-
lowing: by imagining hypothetical cases I’m able to make transparent 
and clear my concepts, beliefs and formerly unreflected presupposi-
tions for myself. Philosophical thought-experiments are examples of 
reflective methods by means of which we can acquire deeper and lucid 
understanding of the logical connections of our concepts and beliefs, as 
well as we are able to recognize logical inconsistencies between them. 
There isn’t and shouldn’t be a universal acceptance of intuitions, 
of course. But the task of philosophy is not simply to describe how the 
people (the “folk”) think about a certain question. If this would be the 
task of philosophy, of course empirical case studies (similar to social-
psychological investigations) can give us relevant information about 
the “folk’s” concepts.22 But philosophy is a reflective and evaluative en-
terprise. It deals with logical connections between beliefs and interpre-
tations of one concept to another, and of course philosophy can make 
normative claims as well. For example, if you think that responsibility 
requires alternate possibilities, Frankfurt’s cases give you reasons to 
21 Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich have considered Goldman’s theory about in-
tuitions, but they didn’t have any satisfactory responses to it. Weinberg – 
Nichols – Stich (2008, 43-44).  
22 Knobe and Nichols argue that the experimental philosophy returns to the 
“traditional” vision of philosophy, i.e. describing how the human beings 
actually think. ”(...) we think that many of the deepest questions of philoso-
phy can only be properly addressed by immersing oneself in the messy, 
contingent, highly variable truths about how human beings really are.” 
(Knobe – Nichols 2008, 3).
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doubt this.23 Or if you maintain that responsibility really does require 
alternate possibilities, you ought to formulate another, more defensible 
theory about it.   
Conceptual analysis based on hypothetical situations presents us 
with alternative ways of thinking about certain philosophical issues. 
Thought-experiments and intuitions are not mystic seemings which 
show us the ultimate truth, but they are heuristic devices by which we 
can explore the connections between our own beliefs, concepts, and 
commitments and show possible difficulties and inconsistencies in our 
conceptual framework.
Here are some abstract examples of the structure of conceptual anal-
ysis: if you believe A, and reflecting on your intuitions can show you 
that B is a consequence of A, then you must also believe B. If you have 
a belief C and an another belief D, and by means of intuitive (intro-
spective) knowledge you recognize that D logically presupposes E, but 
E and C contradict with each other, therefore you should rule out either 
C or D, etc. 
I don’t see why this kind of knowledge cannot be real and useful for 
our theoretical purposes. Of course, a more radical sceptical position 
can be formulated about the reliability of knowledge about our own 
concepts, but denying this kind of fallible knowledge pays too high a 
price, since it entails a global, self-refuting scepticism about rationality 
itself.
Budapest University of Technology and Economics
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